

















## PASTIMES.

## The Whites Score a Seventh Victory Against the Browns.

Harford's Nine Suffer Defeat at the Hands of the St. Louis Browns.

## The Athletics and Cincinnati Lose Games with the Louisville and Mutuals.

## A Grand Yacht Race on Lake Michigan This Afternoon.

## Races at Lexington, Ky., and Elsewhere.

## BASE-BALL.

**CHICAGO VS. BOSTON.**  
Special Dispatch to The Tribune.  
BOSTON, Sept. 15.—The Chicago scored their consecutive victory over the Boston today in the presence of 8,000 people. The game was very exciting and closely contested up to the sixth inning, but the visitors got on top by pitching the latter part of the game, and closed with a decided lead. The Chicago led the score and took the bat. They were easily blanked in the first inning, but on the second they got in their first run on error of Boston's pitcher, and a safe hit by Hines. They added two more runs in the third on the safe hitting of Addy, Adams, McVey, and Peters. In the fifth Addy hit his first on an error, solo home run, and by fast base-running got home an American safe hit. A three-base hit by White sent a single by Hines across a run in the sixth, and the eighth inning the Chicago scored four runs, followed by White's three-base. In the ninth inning Spalding led off with a safe hit, but was thrown out by Leonard after making a wonderful running catch. Addy made a safe hit, and came home on a three-base hit by Hines. The Chicago failed to score until the third inning, when Bradley, with two men out, made a hard hit to center field, which bounded into Hines' head, and reached home. Hines' head hit to White. In the fourth inning the Boston made a good rally for the lead. Leonard led off with a safe hit. O'Brien followed with a hard hit to right field, but was thrown out at second by Addy. Leonard scored on Morril's hit, and Manning's two-base hit brought in another run. The Reds failed to follow up with any effect after this, and were defeated by the Chicago by a score of 10 to 3. The Chicago's victory was a decisive one, and the crowd showed their disapproval of the Boston's play. The home nine in a decided manner. Appended is THE OFFICIAL SCORE.

Boston.	R	H	E	A	E
G. Wright, a. s.	4	0	1	1	0
Leonard, 1. b.	4	1	3	2	1
O'Brien, c. f.	4	0	0	0	0
Morril, 3. b.	4	0	0	0	0
Leonard, 1. b.	4	0	0	0	0
Spalding, c. f.	4	0	0	0	0
Adams, 1. b.	4	0	0	0	0
McVey, 3. b.	4	0	0	0	0
White, c. f.	4	0	0	0	0
Bradley, 1. b.	4	0	0	0	0
Total.	34	9	7	13	5

Chicago.	R	H	E	A	E
Spalding, c. f.	5	1	3	2	1
Adams, 1. b.	5	1	3	2	1
McVey, 3. b.	5	1	3	2	1
White, c. f.	5	1	3	2	1
Bradley, 1. b.	5	1	3	2	1
Total.	25	5	9	13	5

St. Louis.	R	H	E	A	E
Spalding, c. f.	5	1	3	2	1
Adams, 1. b.	5	1	3	2	1
McVey, 3. b.	5	1	3	2	1
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## FOREIGN.

## Another Mixed-Up Version of Turkey's Terms of Settlement.

Gladstone and the London Times Again Indulge in Savage Growls.

## The Ex-Premier Thinks Parliament Should Be Consulted.

British and German Protest Against Religious Intolerance in Spain.

## TURKEY.

**CONSTANTINOPLE, Sept. 15.**—The Turkish government has received the reply of the Powers to the terms of the Powers will formulate the conditions of peace, it will leave the conduct of the negotiations in the hands of the Powers.

**REPORTED MATTER.**  
**BELGRADE, Sept. 15.**—A report is current here that the Turks have captured two of the Serbian redoubts at Little Zvornik.

**THE TURKISH NOTE.**  
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